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I. COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Tax Commission, at page 1 of its Brief, states "as a point of emphasis,
we note that this case is not about taxing Barry Dunn or his income." At page 2,
the Commission again states Idaho is not taxing Barry Dunn or his income. Page
2 also states that Idaho is "taxing the interest that Linda Dunn has in her
community income." Linda Dunn's community income is not the issue, it is
Barry's wages. At footnote 10, page 12, the Commission states "nor does it even
mean that it is taxing Barry Dunn's Texas wages." The Commission argues, at
page 18, "The taxation in this case is not on Barry Dunn or his wages." The tax
is on Barry Dunn's wages. At page 9, the Commission states ''Texas law is clear
that the sole-management community property is not the equivalent of separate
property." At page 14 the Commission states: "The facts of this case present no
violation of the United States Commerce Clause, or the Privileges and Immunities
Clause."
Appellant, Linda Dunn, disputes all these arguments. The Commission is
taxing Barry Dunn's income. The reason is that when the personal income is
earned in another state, the residency state must yield to the source state where
the personal income is earned. If the state where the income is earned does not
-1-

tax it but the state of residence taxes the income, there is no internal consistency
and the residence income tax is invalid. Where there is a conflict of what law
applies, the law that has the most significant relationship to the issue applies.
Significant relationship depends on where "the spouse who acquired the property
was domiciled at the time of acquisition." Seizer v. Sessions, 132 Wash.2d 642,
651, 940 P.2d 261 (Wash. 1997).
Barry Dunn earned and was paid the wages in Texas where he was a
resident and domiciled. He was not an Idaho resident. Linda Dunn's Opening
Brief, page 6, notes that she pays Idaho sales tax. The basic facts cannot be
scrambled. The reason is that the arguments ignore that Linda Dunn's source is
out of Idaho. In Texas, Linda Dunn has no interest in Barry Dunn's wages. They
are treated as separate property before marriage. Washington State also applies
the source rule. Linda Dunn had no interest in Barry Dunn's wages. Linda Dunn
did not earn the wages. The wages were "owned" by Barry Dunn. In the states
where Barry Dunn personally earned the wages, there is no state income tax. The
residency of the person sought to be taxed on the income earned by a non Idaho
resident in Texas does not control. The Commission states, at page 6, "Moreover,
income received from an out-of-state source is clearly taxable."

The state of

source income tax law applies, not the state of residence. If the state of residence
-2-

taxes the income higher, as it does here, the tax is the equivalent of a tariff and
invalid.

When the source is Texas, the non-earner spouse has no right to the

income. It cannot be levied on to pay the non-earner's debts. The dormant
Commerce Clause voids the Idaho tax.

II. ARGUMENT
1.

The Issue Is Clearly One of Law; The District Court Opinion
is not Entitled to Deference.

This is a free review case as clearly only a question of law is presented.
Therefore, this Court will start from the beginning without deference to the
District Court opinion. Student Loan Fund of Idaho v. Payette County, 138 Idaho
684, 687, 69 P.3d 104 (2003).

2.

The Commission would collect against Linda Dunn if she
didn't pay. The distinction is meaningless.

The Commission argues, at page 11, that the state ofldaho is only assessing
a tax and is not seeking the wages of Mr. Dunn to satisfy a debt. The Commission
also argues that "Appellant's Brief is unable to identify a single case that supports
the theory," i.e. sole management community property. Both these contentions
are nullified by Beal Bank v. Gilbert, 417 S.W. 3d 704 (C.A. Tex. 2013). The Court
stated:

-3-

Texas recognizes both sole and joint m,anagement community
property. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.102 (West 2006); Douglas v.
Delp, 987 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tex. 1999).
Sole management
community property is that property which, though acquired during
the marriage, would have belonged to a spouse if single. Douglas,
987 S.W.2d at 883; see also TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 3.102(a). Sole
management community property includes (1) personal earnings; (2)
revenue from separate property; (3) recoveries for personal injuries;
and (4) the increase and mutations of, and the revenue from, all
property subject to the spouse's sole management, control, and
disposition. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 3.102(a). Marital property
subject to the sole management, control, and disposition of one
spouse is not subject to any non-tortious liability of the other spouse.
TEX.FAM.CODE ANN.§ 3.202(b)(2) (West Supp.2013); Moss v. Gibbs,
370S.W.2d 452, 455 (Tex. 1963); Viera v. Viera, 331 S.W.3d 195, 205
n. 10 (Tex.App. El Paso 2011, no pet.).
Id. at 709-10.

The suit in Beal was to collect a non-management spouse's (husband's) debt
from the other spouse's sole management community property.

The sole

management community property was revenue from separate property which,
along with personal earnings, is defined as sole management community property
acquired during marriage. The holding denied collection by the judgment creditor
of the husband. The case also establishes that time of inception determines the
character of the property. Id. at 709. The case applies here. The Commission, at
page 11, argues that it is not attempting to "satisfy a debt". Additional Texas
cases establishing special community property are Montemayor v. Ortiz, 208

-4-

S.W.3d 627, 642-3 (C.A. Tex. 2006); and Douglas v. Delp, 987 S.W.2d 879, 883
(S.C. Tex. 1999). Barry Dunn's wages are sole management community property.
At page 10 and throughout the Commission's Brief, an attempt is made to
distinguish separate property and sole management community property. Both
are treated as separate property acquired before marriage. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN.
§§ 3.102, 3.101. No exception applies in this case. The important law is that the

non management spouse, here Linda Dunn, has no legal right or interest in the
property, whether called community or separate. Sole management community
property is not liable for debts, including taxes incurred, by the non-managing
spouse. Formal linguistics must give way to pragmatics. The statement, by Robin
Cook in his book "Crisis", applies. "If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, it's
a duck!" This overused idiom applies. It is not the label, but the effect that
counts. The earnings of Barry Dunn do not create an interest in his spouse as
they are not subject to Linda Dunn's non tort debts, including tax debts.
Contrary to the Commission's statement, a page 7, Barry Dunn's wages are the
equivalent of separate property.

3.

The Tax is a Debt.

If the Commission only assessed and does not satisfy a debt there would be

no need for Linda Dunn to file a bond. I.C. 63-3050 provides that any tax owed
-5-

is a debt owed to the state and "May be collected by lien foreclosure or sued for
and recovered in any proper form of action." The Attorney General enforces the
tax lien, I.C. 63-3056. The Tax Commission can seize property to pay taxes, I.C.
63-3057. The statement that the wages of Barry Dunn is not seeking Idaho tax
to satisfy a debt contradicts I.C. 63-3050 as a tax deficiency "shall constitute a
debt to the state of Idaho." The District Court's observation was not correct.

4.

The Texas Community Property Law Controls.

The Commission, in a footnote at page 7, f. 2, informs the Court that Idaho
community property laws might have applied. The Commission, at page 5, argues
that Linda Dunn does not substantially dispute that Washington law also
prohibits the tax. This is incorrect. Linda Dunn, at page 15 of her Brief, cites

Seizer v. Sessions, 132 Wash.2d 643, 940 P.2d 261 (Wash. 1997) and other
significant relationship cases at pages 14 and 15 of her Opening Brief. These
cases review the issue of determining what law applies and applied the most
significant relationship test. Seizer, supra at 649. The place of acquisition of
movable property determines what community property law applies. Washington,
like Texas, also has no income tax. The law where the wages were earned by the
non resident is applied. Washington's community property statutes, unlike Texas,
do not define wages as the equivalent of separate property. However, the dormant
-6-

Commerce Clause also applies to Washington income as crossing state lines
creates the tariff effect. No tax is disproportionate to tax on half.

5.

The U.S. Constitution's Dormant Commerce Clause Applies To
Prevent Idaho From Taxing Linda Dunn on Barry Dunn's Wages.

The Commission Argues, at page 14, that the dormant Commerce Clause
does not apply to thjs case. Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne,_ U.S._, 135
S.Ct. 1787, 191 L.Ed.2d 813 (2015), unequivocally holds that when a resident of
one state earns personal income from an out-of-state source, U.S. Constitution's
dormant Commerce Clause, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, is implicated. When "tax schemes
that inherently discriminate against interstate commerce without regard to the tax
policies of the other State" the internal consistency test is applicable. Id. at 1802.
The Wynne court treated the income tax like a tariff. Id. at 1804. Like a state
tariff. Id. at 1794. Taxing wages earned in Texas burdened interstate commerce.
The burden on interstate commerce is to make sure the total tax is the same. Id.
at 1805.

Wynne included personal state income tax within the Interstate

Commerce Clause that grants Congress the power to regulate commerce among
the several states. Id at 1794. Any time a state taxes personal income earned in
another state, more heavily than the state of source, the dormant Commerce
Clause is violated. The aim is to prevent economic balkanization as the tax on

-7-

out-of-state income acts as a tariff. Parker v. Idaho Tax Commission, 148 Idaho
842, 230 P.3d 734 (2010) at 84 7 held that the Commerce Clause is not implicated
unless the taxpayer "demonstrates" that the "income has an identifiable interstate
activity or market." Wynne abolished any such test.

The factual basis is

comparison. Parker also stipulated that the state of residence, Idaho, not the sate
of source, applied. Id. at 846. The Idaho Supreme Court, like all other state
courts, is bound by the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal
Constitution and law. James v. City of Boise,_ U.S._ 136, S.Ct. 685, 193
L.Ed. 694 (2016); Williams v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 2156, 195 L.Ed.2d 819 (2016);
and Alexander v. Stribal, 161 Idaho 253, 385 P.3d 431, 443 f 4. (2016). Wynne
applies here as the state of Idaho taxes the out-of-state income, but the states of
source do not. The tax is discriminatory. Here, Idaho taxes income exempt in
Texas where it was earned in Texas; Idaho is taxing out-of-state income. The
Wynne's were Maryland residents who earned pass through subchapter S income
from other states. No income was earned in Maryland. The Court considered the
pass through income as personal income. Wynne, supra 1803, 1804. The only
issue in the case was a county tax capped at 3.2%. Both were held to be state
taxes. Id. at 1792. Maryland did not allow a credit for the county tax. The
Supreme Court held that the tax violated the dormant Commerce Clause and was
-8-

invalid. The Court stated "Maryland's tax scheme is inherently discriminatory and
operates as a tariff." Id. at 1804. If income that crosses state lines is taxed
higher than if the income is only earned in one state, the internal consistency test
is violated and the tax is invalid. Idaho is attempting to tax Linda Dunn in the
same way as the Wynnes as the income sought to be taxed to them was earned in
other states. Barry Dunn earned the wages in other states that had no income
tax. At source, no income tax had to be paid. Like the Wynne's subchapter S
income, only residency was considered. There was no tax at the source, i.e. Texas.
Idaho wants a tax based on residence. This is a discriminatory tariff. Barry
Dunn's wage income, at least hypothetically, crossed state lines as Idaho wants
to tax it as Linda Dunn's community property. In Texas, the non-earner spouse
has no interest in the earner spouse's wages.

This gives commerce clause

scrutiny as these are the same facts as the facts of Wynne. Maryland, where the
Wynnes were residents, taxes all income of its residents regardless of where the
income is earned. Wynne, id. at 1798. Wynne also concludes that a state may tax
all income, even income earned outside the jurisdiction without violating the Due
Process Clause. However, "Similarly, Maryland's raw power to tax its residents
out-of-state income does not insulate its tax scheme from scrutiny under the
dormant Commerce Clause." Id. at 1799. Wynne quotes Annco v. Hardesty, 467
-9-

U.S. 638, 642, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984). A state "may not tax a
transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it
occurs entirely within a state." Wynne, id. at 1794 (internal quotes omitted).

Wynne adopted rules of interstate commerce to state income tax of individuals
earned in other states. The comparison was a personal county income tax. The
Maryland law does not allow residents a credit for county tax. The result was that
the county tax could be taxed twice. The states of comparison are state of
residence compared to income earned elsewhere. This comparison fits the Dunns.
The dormant Commerce Clause applies. Idaho taxes Barry Dunn's wages more
heavily than Texas and Washington. The Commission notes, at page 13, that

Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 393 P.2d 35 (1964) applies. In Herndon, both
Oklahoma tax and Idaho tax was paid on income earned within Oklahoma. Id. at
338. The above discussion applies. Residents can be taxed on income earned in
other states. The issue if it is taxed higher and no credit is allowed, the tax
statute is invalid. Wynne abrogates Herndon. "Bob will pay more income tax than
April solely because he earns income interstate. Specifically, Bob will have to pay
1.25% tax twice, once to a state where he resides and once in state B where he
earns the income."

Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804. No credits were involved in

Herndon and "the tax scheme fails the internal consistency test." Wynne, S.Ct.
-10-

at 1803. The facts of Herndon fit Wynne. The dormant Commerce Clause is
violated.
The Commission ignores Linda Dunn's argument, pages 7-10, that

Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, _U.S. __ , 135 S.Ct. 1787, 191
L.Ed.2d 813 (2015) is new law. "The question before the Court in Wynne was
whether in the face of over lapping claims to the same income by the state of
residence and the state of source, the former must yield to the latter." Walter
Hellerstein, "Deciphering the Supreme Court's Opinion in Wynne," 123 Journal of
Taxation 4, July 2015 (copy attached in Appendix). An income tax earned in the
source state that was tax free in the source state could not be taxed in the state
of residence if it creates additional tax burdens when state lines are crossed.
States taxing income on a residence basis must yield to source if a risk of unequal
taxation is the result. Barry Dunn, a non resident, earned wages in Texas and
Washington, states that do not tax wage income. His spouse, Linda, did not earn
the income.
residency.

The Commission wan ts to tax Linda solely on the basis of her
The dormant Commerce Clause is violated. Here, the Texas

Constitution prohibits state income tax on wages. The joint stipulation R 39-40
proved that Barry Dunn was a non resident of Idaho and lived and worked in
Texas. Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at 1796 holds that
-11-

a tax on individual net income is a direct and immediate burden on interstate
commerce. Wynne, supra at 1802, applies the economic burden test. When Idaho
seeks to tax Barry Dunn's wages earned in Texas that were free of Texas income
tax, the internal consistency test caused disparate discrimination. Washington
earnings also violate the test, they are tax free in Washington. Idaho Code § 633026A applies to non residents which include Barry Dunn.

His income was

earned outside of Idaho. Failure to apply this Idaho Code Section completes the
discrimination argument.

This statute states income and does not address

credits. In-state rates favoring in-state hospitals over out-of-state hospitals violate

Wynne and the dormant Commerce Clause. Mary Hitchcock Hospital v. Cohen,
2016 WL 1735818 at *4 (D.C. New Hampshire 2016). The discrimination is not

only on tax credits. It prohibits all forms of economic protectionism. Taxation of
cross-border transactions between a corporate taxpayer and an out-of-state office
is discriminatory. Wal-Mart Puerto Rico v. Zaragoza-Gomez, 834 F.3d 110, 126 (1st,
Cir. 2016).

6.

The Privileges and Immunities Clause is Violated; If Personal
State (ncome Taxes Discriminate Solely on the basis of
Residency and Non Residency, they are Invalid.

Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at 1799, adopted thecaseofCampsNewfound/Otwatonna
v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 117 S.Ct. 1590, 137 L.Ed.2d 852 (1997) to
-12-

apply the internal consistency test to the operation of local taxes, as regardless of
the local situs of the tax, the effect is economic protectionism. Wynne states "[a]
tax on real estate, like any other tax may impermissibly burden interstate
commerce." Id. at 1797. Walter Hellerstein, "Deciphering the Supreme Court's

Opinion in Wynne," 123 Journal of Taxation (July 2015), pages 4, 15, 16 (copy
attached) discussed this change by Wynne and states that the Wynne reliance on

Camps/ Newfound now implicates persons who "live in one state and work in
another" (page 16). Hellerstein states that "it is only a matter of time before these
actions are launched" referring to source based decisions.

Hellerstein cites

Tamagni v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York, 695 N.E.2d 1125, (C.A.
N.Y. 1998) a case that held that failure of New York to allow a credit on taxes paid
to the state of domicile (New Jersey) does not implicate the dormant Commerce
Clause. "The New York income tax operates to tax residents of this state, without
regard to their activities in other states, so long as the States definition of resident
does not violate due process (and there is no claim here that it does), no violation
of the Commerce Clause is apparent." Id. at 544. The dissent by Judge Titione
cites Camps/Newfound Owatonna v. Town of Harrison 520 U.S. 564, 117 S.Ct.
1590, 137 L.Ed.2d 582 (1997) and other cases arguing that the question is not
whether interstate commerce is affected but whether interstate commerce is taxed.
-13-

Id. at 546. Tamagini would be decided differently if after Wynne. Parker v . Idaho
State Tax Commission, 148 Idaho at 848-9, states "the Parkers would need to show
that the state's taxation of Kathy's entire income has a substantial effect on a
identifiable interstate economy activity or market.' Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at 1797,
eliminated the distinction between corporate and individual income taxes. There
is no longer any identification where out-of-state personal income is an issue on
state tax cases the scrutiny of unequal burden is automatic. "See Camps

Newfound, 520 U.S. at 574, 117 S.Ct. 1590 ("a tax on real estate, Like any other

tax, may impermissibly burden interstate commerce. (Emphasis added.)" (Internal
quotes disregarded). The examples in Wynne, 135 S.Ct at 1802, point out that a
person that earns income in another state will pay more. This is a violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause. A tariff is a tax imposed on imported goods or
services. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged (1981), "tariff.
. . (2) a schedule, system, or scheme of duties imposed by a government on
imported or exported goods for the production of revenue, for the artificial
fostering of home industries, or as a means of coercing foreign governments to
grant reciprocity privileges." This is the answer. If the income did not cross state
lines it would not be taxed if both were Texas (or Washington) residents. The
county tax in Wynne as on income earned outside the state. Camps Newfound,
-14-

520 U.S. at 581, states "as our cases make clear, this sort of discrimination is at
the very core of activities forbidden by the dormant Commerce Clause. [A) state
may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than
when it occurs entirely within the State."

(Internal quotes omitted).

The

Commission argues, at page 10, that Wynne does not apply since there was no
"evidence or argument that Linda Dunn was not entitled to a credit for taxes paid
to another state." The holding in Wynne is that if no credit is allowed for the
county tax, the dormant Commerce Clause is violated. "Maryland allows them a
credit against the 'state' tax but not the 'county' tax." Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at 1792.
Lack of credit was the issue in Wynne.

7.

The Privileges and Immunities Clause Applies.

The Commission's Brief, at page 6, also argues that the U.S. Constitution's
Privileges and Immunities Clause is not violated.

Lunding v. New York Tax

Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 118 S.Ct. 766, 139 L.Ed.2d 717 (1998) completely
rejects this argument. The Privileges and Immunities Clause applies. "Where non
residents are subject to different treatment there must be 'reasonable' ground for
diversity of treatment." Citing Travis v. Yale and Towne, 252 U.S. 60, 40 S.Ct. 228,
64 L.Ed 460 ( 1920) Id. at 298, the Lunding case applied the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, U.S. Const. Art 4, § 2, to invalidate a New York income tax law
-15-

denying non residents a personal exemption on state taxes but not to non
residents. The non residents lived in New Jersey that had no income tax. "A state
may not barter away the right conferred upon its citizens by the Constitution of
the United States, to enjoy the privileges and immunities when they go to other
states." Id. at 82. Igoe v. Pataki, 696 N.Y.S.2d 355 (S.C. N.Y. 1999) struck down
a commuter tax on non residents working in New York but resides in other states.
The tax violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. "While the state wishes to
ease the tax burdens for its residents to increase their spending power, residency
alone is a wholly arbitrary and irrational basis on which to crate distinctions
among taxpayers." Id. at 364. This case also notes that consumption taxes are
paid by non residents. Id. at 303. Discriminatory treatment based on a citizen's
state of residence is a potential violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.

Children's Seashore House v. Waldman, 197 F.3d 654, 660 N. 5 (3rd Cir. 1999).
"5. Likewise, the courts consider discriminatory treatment based on a citizen's
state or residence a potential violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
See Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 118 S.Ct. 766, 774,
139 L.Ed.2d 717 (1998) ("where non residents are subject to different treatment,
there must be a reasonable ground for diversity of treatment") (internal quotations
omitted)". Texas rejects a state income tax in its Constitution. It also protects a
-16-

married wage earner from the debts of the non earning spouse. Texas law of the
source applies. The recent dormant Commerce Clause rejects the residency rule,
which is the only reason the tax is assessed. The residency rule does not apply
where the income is earned out of state by the non-wage earner. Idaho taxation
is a forbidden tariff. It is also a violation of equal protection. County of Alameda

v. City and County of San Francisco, 97 Cal.Rptr. 175, 19 Cal.App.3d 750 (C.A.
Cal. 1971). "The city may not accomplish this end by imposing a tax solely upon
non residents engaged in a particular activity while totally exempting residents
engaged in the same activity." Id. at 179.
8.

Blangers Applies.

The Commission, at page 13, footnote 12, argues thatBlangers v. State Dept

of Revenue and Taxation, 114 Idaho 944,963 P.2d 1052 (1998) does not apply as
"there is no non resident being taxed by Idaho." The distinction is not logical for
the reason that Idaho tried to tax non-residents' earnings for services performed.
Linda Dunn did not earn the wages. Barry Dunn, a non resident, earned the
wages where there is no income tax. The Court in Blangers relied on lack of
nexus, the due process clause and that "the trail crews do not owe their livelihood
to Idaho." Id. at 952. Blangers applies.

-17-

III. CONCLUSION

Barry Dunn's wages earned in Texas are his sole property. Linda Dunn has
no Idaho taxable income from Barry Dunn's Texas wages.

The dormant

Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clauses prohibit taxing nonresident income in Idaho when the state of the source, including Washington, has
no state taxation. The refund should be granted.

Dated February 17, 201 7

Attorney for Linda Dunn, Appellant

~--"££~
Attorney for Linda Dunn, Appellant
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WALTER HELLERSTEIN

In Wynne, the Supreme Court held that Maryland's personal Income tax
regime violated the dormant Commerce Clause because It taxed Income
on a residence and source basis without giving a credit to residents for In·
come taxed on a source basis by other states. The Court suggested, how·
ever, that a state may tax residents on all their Income without providing a
credit for taxes paid by other states If the state did not tax nonresidents on
Income from sources within the state, even though such a taxing regime
might result In double taxation of Interstate commerce.

In Comptrollu of tht Irrasury v. Wynne, 135
S. Ct. 1787 (2015), the U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider
the following question: "Does the
United States Constitution prohibit a
state from taxing all the income of its
residents-wherever earned-by mandating a credit for taxes paid on income earned in other states?"1 Stated
somewhat more broadly. the question
before the Court in Wynne was
whether, in the face of overlapping
claims to the same income by the state
of residence and the state of source,
the former must yield to the latter as
a matter of federal constitutional law
to avoid double taxation.
The short answer that the Court
gave to this question in Wyrint was
·no; even while holding that Maryland's tax regime violated the Commerce Clause. In response to a dissenting opinion's contention that the

l,

l'

4
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Court's decision "requires a State taxing based on residence to 'recede' to
a State taxing based on source; the
Court in Wynne: declared: "We establish no such rule of priority." Indeed
the Court went on to suggest, although it explicitly did not hold? that
under a properly designed tax regime
Maryland could constitutionally tax
its residents on all of their income
without providing any relief from
taxes imposed by other states.1 Moreover, although Maryland was not:
constitutionally required to adopt a
tax, regime under which residence
yielded to source, the Court made it
dear that Maryland could have
avoided the Court's ultimate ruling
had Maryland in fact adopted such a
regime: So what did the Court actually
hold in Wynne, why did it take the analytical route it chose lu reach it1; conclusion, and what arc the implications

of that choice? This article addresses
those questionSc

WYNNE:fflESHORTVERSION
Maryland imposes an income tax on
its residents with respect to all income
earned regardless of source. The tax
has bo1h a state and a county component. although both levies are state
tax:es,4 with the rate of the county com-·
ponent depending on the taxpayer's
county of residence, and ranging from
3.2% to 1.25%. Although both the state
and county components ofthe tax apply to the resident's income regardless
of source, and thus potentially to income that is taxable in other states,
Maryland limited the credit it granted
for taxes its residents paid to other
states to the state portion of the tax.
and it provided no credit for any tax
imposed by other states for the county
portion of the tax. Maryland also taxes
nonresidents on income from sources
within the state. Like the tax on residents, the tax on nonresidents has
both a state anc) county component.
with the county component levied,at
the lowest county rate, to wit., 1.250/o.
The state component of the tax was
unproblematic from a Commerce
Clause standpoint because of the full
credit granted against the state component for taxes paid to other states.•
Consequently.the focus of the Court's
opinion was on the county portion of
the state tax.
Brian and Karen Wynne were
Maryland residents. During the year
t.
(2006) B . Wynn
d
a . issue
, nan
e owne
stock in a Subchapter S corporation,
which filed ~iate income tax returns
in 39 states. The Wynnes earned income passed through to them from
the S Corporation, and they reported.
the income on their individual Maryland income tax returns, daiming a
credit for income taxes paid to other
states.' When the Maryland Comptroll er of the Treasury allo:v,r~d the
·. ·. ''""""··· .•''1\'Ni.dlfror·\h.(!!sfufe),p'{),rl1!m ,<:'if 6.)~li\K
but denied it for the county portion
of the tax, the Wynnes challenged the
denial under the Commerce Clause.
Al th Ough the CO U rt adverts to the
pass-through nature of the Wynnes'
STATE & L OCA L

income, its opinion proceeds on the
premise that the income in question
is personal income earned by resident
individuals as distinguished from
"corporate" income that is included in
an individual shareholder's tax base
pursuant to the S corporation eledion,
At first blush, the Court's opinion in
Wynnt~pl,)~i,\9($lm.ple ~.nd.~traightf:9~ward. ~er 'brieffy re~~ing tt}~:fa~
miliar history of the Court's dormant
Commerce Oause doctrine, and with
a perfunctory nod to Justice Scalia's
and Justice Thornas's revisionist views
as to the legitimacy of that doctrine?
the Court declared that 'our existing
dormant Commerce Clause cases all
but dictate the result" namely, the ur.1constitutionality of Maryland's taxing
r{;,gir;i::te, The C;pu,rifound "{tlhree cases
ihvolving ~tiqn of the income of
domestic corporations ... particularly
instructive~ All three cases-J.D. Adams
Mfg. Co. v. Storm, 304 U.S. 307 (l 938),
Gwin, Whi.lt f:I Prince, Inc. v. Hmneford. 305
U.S. 434, (1939), and Central Grtyhound
Lines, inc. v. Mtalty, 334 U.S. 653 (1948)struck down unapportioned gross receipts t.axes on the ground that they
burdened interstate commerce by ex-

posing it to the risk of a double or
multiple tax burden to which intrastate commerce was not exposed.
The Court summarized the import of
these cases, and their implications for
Maryland's tax regime, as follows: 'In
all three of these cases, the Court
struck down a state tax scheme that
might have resulted in double taxation ofincome earned out of th.e State
and that discrimina.ted in favor of intrastate over interstate economic activity.... Maryland's tax sr.hemc is
unconstitutional for similar reasons~
The Court further observed that although these cases did not invoke the
Court's "internal consistency• doctrine-which was hardly a surprise because the doctrine would not be articulated for another 40 yearse-they
nevertheless, in substance, reflected
the application of the doctrine. As the
Court later described the doctrine in
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines,
Inc., 514 U.S.175 (1995): "Internal consistency is preserved when the imposition of a tax identical to the one in
question by every other State would
add no burden to interstate t.'Ommerce
that intrastate commerce would not
also bear. This test asks nothing about
the economic reality .reflected by the

=:c:;::,iLc.omptro11erotrheueasuryv.

:=not~':!:i!;t:!;:'~~~~

i As de<"...albed more 1unv below, ttte Court's reasoning
1n WynnesuggeststhatMarvlandcould·remedythe
=nstltut/Onallty cl Its tax scheme' by adop1ing a
schemcthattaxedonlYon thet>aslsof residence Tiw
Courtwasquk:ktoobser11e,howeVef.that"wedonot
aeclde the constttutlonallty of a hypothetical tax
scheme Iha! Maryland might adapt because such a
scheme IS not before ur,:,
3 See tei<t accompanying notes 28·30
4 Thts Is tsue as a matter ot state law. see Frey v. Complro/ler of /he TrW$KY, 29 A,3d 475 (Mel., 2011). and

come by Maryland This IS the Is the way wtually aa
llleometaxcredltlr1Qreg1mesoperate.SeeHeUerste11\
State n»<at/on Treatise, sup-a note 4. 1 20JO: SectlOn
904 Cleaeral foreign tax credit llrnlta!lonl
6 The states employ a variety of means ror assuring
that nonresidents corporation shareholders pay

The Cowt's Opinion in Wynne

1

taxes on Ulelr pass,,through Income /rom sources
wltllln the state. oltfln t,y condltlOnlnQ pass-ttrough
tseatment on the nonresklent stiarehOlders' agreement to Ille returns or by having the s corporatlOn
wltf"llold taxes rrom (or pay taxes on behalf of) their
shareholders,SeeHeUersteln.State Taxauon Treattse.
suP1a note 4, 120.00[2Jlal(U1l

''*"·

wouldhavebeentrueasamatterottectera1arat1tut1ona1 law.even If thecoonty-tevel tax were lnder.Je1ld·
ent of the state 4ewi tax for state law iJUf'PO".,!?S.'For
federal comtltutlonal purposes, the dl!illnctlon be·
tween state and local t:axEs hasnomeanlro-tlley are
aUexer~ot·s1a1e·power1nsorarastheConst1tu·
Uon Is concerned, See Hetlersteln. Hetle!stt~n. and
swain. state Taxation. Third Edition (Thomson
Reuters/WG&L. 2015 rev.>. 1 l!l.02[91 (hereinafter
Hellersleln. Stalt• Taxa/lOn TreallSe>. Heller stein. "Fed·
eral Constltuuonal Res!faln~ CJ!1 State Property Tax

7 See Helerstelt\ Stille Taxat/on Troot/se,SIJP'a note 4.
'II 4J2[21 (discussing Justice Scalla's and Justice
Thomas·s challenge 10 the Court's dormant Com8

merre Clause doctrine).
TheSupremeCourt,llrstsuggestedt:hatthepr/tqlle
of ·1ntema1 consistency· corislralned state taxing
power In Container COiµ of America v. Franchise Tax
Board. 46.3 159 (1983). See generaQyMellerstein.

u.s.
•
:-'~A~itl:li~M:~ ~WiW -··· ""lif,oi~'fo~ii'~~?:,~~'<in'11tt- · -···· ·· ···
tiiiit/ ProPQSi>ls.' siaielax Notes.6/11i07. pp. 789, 790Emerging c~~e Clau~ RGtrillni 00 sii>te fax:

791(1~atXlratln<J on proposl~on lhat federal consuw..
Ilona! re<..tra1n1s are evaluated at the state level. not
the local levett Ttris issue Is tur1herexptore<1 below
See text accompanylr)ll notes 43-46 Infra..
s The term ·1u11 credit.' as us..od In the Iext means a credit

againstata,on1ncometha11ssub/ectto~1xoo1hb)'

atlon: 87 Mi<:n.LHev. 138 (1988}. see also HeUersteln.
'Is 'Internal Consistency' Dead?, Reflections on an
Evolvlng com:nerce aause Restraint on State Tal<il·
1100: 61 Tax L, Rrc.>v.1 0007}. Hellersteln.SMre ·T.'!XaUon
rreattse. suiia note 4. , 4.161ll(dlscusslng ·internal
conslstt'f)(:Y"doctrlne).

JULY 2015 .j: J OUR NA i.. OF TAXATION

@

5

tax, but simply looks to the structure
of the tax at issue to sec whether its
identical application by every State in
the Union would place interstate
commerce at a disadvantage as compared with intrastate commerce~
Maryland's taxing regime indisputably flunked the internal consistency te.st and the Court so held. After
noting that applic.ation of the internal
consistency test required that Maiyland's taxing sd1eme be evaluated as
a whole fi.e., it must include consideration of (1) the county portion of the
tax on income thcit Maryland residents
earn in Maryland. (2) the county portion of the tax on income that Maryland residents earn in other States, and
(3) lhe special nonresident county portion of the tax on income that nonresidents earn in Maiyland: the Court illustrated the internal consistency of
Maryland's by the following example:
Assume that e.very State imp~si:d the fol-

l!>l/#1'1$ ~"ll(!:$, Whi¢fi'are simllatl!J.M~eyland~ "ootinty• ·arid "special ,nb'ill'e5ldi:nt"

taxes: (I) a 1.25% tl':lx on int'Ome that residents earn ln State, (2) a 1.25% tax on
income that residents earn in other ju~
lisdictions, and (3) a 1.25% tax on income that nonresidents cam in State,
Assu,~ mrt.l:¢rthat two ~~;}1Pdl
and :n'oo; bath, live in St1rti,-.,A/ h11Uhat
April earns her income in State ·. A
whereas Bob earns his Income in State B.
fo'. this>dro,.i.ristance, Bob will mi. roQl'.C
in¢t>rne ~ .~,:art April solely ·
.
earns ln(;Qn'ie interstate; ,$ ~ .. ..
will have to pay a l.251!f/ !W<'.ortly Of!~,
to State A But Bob will have to pay a
1.25% tax twice: once to State A, where
he resides, and 1mc:e to Stat.e B, where he
earns the income~

If this were all there was to Wynnethat the Court's "existing Commerce
Clause cases all but dictate the result"
under a simple application of the internal consistency principle-it would
hardly merit an article in THE JOURNAL.
Nor would it explain why the Court
took the case in the first place, which
remains a mystery in any evenl;9 nor

,,'
r:

i,
I

why it took the Court 28 pages to explain the supposedly preordained re-·
suit; nor why rl1e case produced four

different: opinions together with a bitter 5-4 split on the outcome. For at
least i\ partial ClCplanation of these
questions, the article explores the
"Unabridged Version· of the Court's
opinion in Wynru below. Before that
task is undert:aken, howevet; the article
explores an alternative path that the
Court might have taken to its decision
that woul.d have led to a much
shorter opinion and raised fewer
questions than the Court's longer
opinion has left in its wake.

@)
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The DonnantCommerce
Clause Forbids the
Risk of Multiple Taxation

For more than 75 years, the Supreme
Court has steadfastly adhered to tl1e
doctrine that the dormant Commerce
Clause forbids state taxes that expose
interstate commerce to a risk of multiple taxation to which intrastate commerce is not exposed.12 In Wtsttm Live
Stock v. Bureau of Revtnut, 303 U.S. 250
(I 938), the Court first artic.ulated the
basic proposition that while interstate
THE ROAD NOTTAJCEN10
commerce mw,t "pay its way; the dorlhere was a straighter path than the mant Commerce Clause protects inone the Court took in Wynne to the re- terstate commerce from "beading] rusult that it reached. In the interest of mulative burdens not imposed on
fulldisclosure. it was a path suggested local commerce~ Shortly thereafter. in
by the Brief of the Maiyland Oiamber striking down a levy on dormant
of Commerce as Amirus Curiae in sup- Commerce Clause grounds, the Court
port of the taxpayers, a brief that the in J.D. Adams reiterated that fundaauthor of this article helped write, but mental principle: "Interstate commerce
it also reflects views that the author would ... be subjected to the risk of a

has long held,n and that as the ensuing discussion hopefully will demonstrate, are still of some relevance,
notwithstanding the Court's opinion
in Wynnt. The straighter path was
based on the fundamental proposition that longstanding Commerce
Oause doctrine requires states taxing
income on a residence basis to yield
their taxing rights to states taxing the
same income on a source basis to

WALTER HELLERSTEIN is the Francis Shackelford Professor of TaxaUon and D1st1ngu1st1ed Research
Professor at the Univc."1'.Slty of Georgia School of Law. cwuthor of the treatise state Taxatloo CThomsOn
Reuters/WG&IJ. and editor ot this department tor THE JOURNAL Professor Hellerstein co-authored a
.brief on behalf o/- the Maryland Chamber of Commerce as am1ciis curiae In support of the taxPaYers
in 1,1,yrme. The views expressed in this artlele, however. are entirely his own and do not necessarily
represent those of the Maryland Chamber of Cornmerca The author would like to thank Dan T. Coenen. Andrew Grace, Jerome B.. Llbin. Herman Rosenthal. and John A Swain for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this arUcle. All errors or omissions are the atithor's own. Copyright© 2015,
Walter Hellerstein
,.
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avoid the inexorable double or multiple taxation that would result from
the simultaneous exerci.se of both
states' taxing rights.

JULY 2015

double tax burden to which intrastate
commerce is not exposed, and which
the commerce clause forbids~ In Gwin,
White & Prina, the court likewise condemned a tax under the dormant
Commerce Cause because it exposed
interstate commerce to "the risk of a
multiple burden to which local commerce is not exposed~ JD. Adams and
Gwin, Whit( fr Prince, of course, were
the very precedents the Court invoked
in Wynnl as "all but dictat(ingl" the result in the case.
The Court has never wavered from
its commitment to this basic tenet of
its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence that is indispensable to
the protection of free trade from burdensome taxes.11 Again, Wynne reflects
STATE & LOCAL

the same commitment to the avoidance of multiple lax burdens.

Resldence--Based Claims Must
Yield to Source-Based Claims to
Avoid Multiple Taxation

Over the years, the Court has consideK-<l a number of cases addressing the
risk of multiple taxation that arises bec11use of the conflicting dairns of (1)
the state of a taxpayer's residence to
tax 100% of a taxpayer's income or
property. regardless of its geographical
source or location, and (2) the state
where the income or property is
earned or located to tax the portion
of the income or property with its
source or location (hereafter simply
"source") in that state.14 The problem
arises because, apart from the dormant
Commerce Clause and the interests in
free trade that it protects, the claims of
both..the state of residence and the
state of sourc.-e are legitimate. Although
Wynne involved income rather than
property, the ui1derlyit)8 Cqmmerce
Clause question-how to.deal with
competing daims based on residence
and source in light of free trade concerns-are common to both contexts,
and the Court's underlying reasoning
in both contexts, at least prior to
Wynne. ap~rcd tobc ir1terch.angf!aple.
The·~rt has lm'IS re,;plffi{i;~ the
states' power to tax income and prop-

Commerce ~use

• If the Courts •ex;sUng
cases aiibut
dictate the result reached In lhls case l)y Maryland's
highest court· as the Court declared, one may won·
whY U,e Court did not simply cleny the Complrol·
ler of the Treasury's petition for certiorari. On Its race.
the case seemed to meet none of the criteria that the
Court has esl.abllshed for determining Whether to
grant certlOrarl from a stale court declslOrt namely.
·a state court of last resort t1as decided an lrnl)O(tant
federal question In a IN&,/ that conWd; with the docl·
ston of another st.ate court of last resort or of a l.h~ted
stares court of appeals"or "a state court.- haS decided
an Important question of federal law that has not
been but shoUld be. setlled by this C.ourl, or has deClded an Important federal question in a w-.ry tnatconfllcts with relevant decisions of this Court' U,S,
supreme Court Rule 10, available at wwwsupreme·
courtgov/ctruieSl2013Rulesofth<.-'Courtl)df
10 Willi apologies to Robert Frost for wgge<;1,ng U1at po·
etrv and taK raw rove anything In commo~
11 See. e.g. Hellerstein, Stare TaXilt/on Tr!!at1se, svpra note
4. ,i 20.10l2l[bl (constitutional restraints on the denial
by a taxpayer's state of resldP.r1<:-e or a credll for personal incorne taxes paid to other states); 5waln and
Hellerstefn, ·state Jurlsdie~on to 'lax 'Nowhere· Activ·
1tv.· 33 va., Tax Rev, 209 (2013). Needless to say, the
niixt rev~lon of the treatise (cLii11uk1tlve supp/em<cint

der

erty on the basis of residence and
source. Thus, in the context of income
taxation on the basis of residence, the

Court has observed: "That the receipt
of income by a resident of the terrilPl'Y of a taxing sciverelgntyis,a la'1able event is universally tet!)ghiied.
Domicile itself affords a basis for such
taxation'.' 15 Accordingly; "[a]s to residents [a State] may, and does, exert its
taxing power over their income from
all sources, whether within or without
the State... 716 The rationale for allowing states to tax residents on their inco me without regard to source is
•founded upon the protection afforded to the recipient of the income
by the state, in his person, in his right
to receive the income, and in his enjoyment of it when received;'11 as well
as his "[elnjoyrnent of the privileges
of residence in the state and the attendant right to invoke the protection
of its laws~1e
The states' power to tax on the basis of source is no less well rcl'Ognized
than their power to tax on the basis
of residence.I' However. because the
power to tax based ori .t,auri:edetives
only from the protection that the
states provide to ·persons, property,
and business transactions within their
borda's~20 it is necessarily more circumscribed than the. power to tax that
flows from "[d]omicil itseJf.'21 Conse· · 2015·2. summer 20l5lwlll modify the cited dlsaJsslon.
as appropriate, to reflect the Court's oplnlOn In Wyr111e.
12 See generally Hellerstetn, S/,1/e T/v<.3//on Tteiit/se, wpra
note 4, 1 409 (tracing development or doctrlnel
u See, e.i ,Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of WSAnge/es,441
US.434 (1979) ("It Is acommonplace of constltutlOnal
jurisprudence that multiple taxation may wen be offensive to the Cornrr~'fre Clause.:?; Mob/I OJI C()(p. v.
Commr ot Taxes, 445 U.~..425 (190C))(recogn1Zlng and
addr'-'Sslng claims that U1e dormant Commerce
Clause bars tax !hat ·imposes a burden on Interstate
and fotelgn coomerce bY subjecting.•, lncorne to a
substantial risk of mulUple taxal:IOn"l: Exxon C()(p. v.
Wlsconstn Dep?. of R!ivenlJ/iJ,447 U,$,207 0980)(rev
ognlzlng imd a<ldmslng a claim that the dormant
Commerce Clause bars tax that 'sut)Jects Interstate
business to ;in unfair burden of multi~! ta1<atlon">.
MeadWestvaco Cc)(fl v. lllino/$ Oep? of RIM!nue, 553
u.s, 16 (2008) ('The Commerce Clause forbids the
siirtcs to k.w taXCffi that discriminate against Interstate
commerce or that burden IL by subjecllng activities
to mulUple or unfairly apportioned taxation,1
14 For ease or expositlon. the term 'source" IS used to
mean a location. ottK...,. than the residence of the tax·
payer, where a state rr.1y assert the power to tax
based on ltS relationship Lt> the income or property
In question,, In ttie context of Income taxatkm, the'

quently, when states seek to tax nonresident individuals and corporations
using source as their sole jurisdictional basis, their power extends only
to the nonresident~· "property owned
within the State and their business,
trade, or profession carried on therein,
and th.e tax is only on such income
as is derived from those sources~zz It
is worth observing that there is nothing in Wynnr that undermines the
foregoing principles. Indeed, Wynne
fully erttbta<;~tl,¢ryt It is in the ,rec.
oncili;ilfoh of these principles in light
of the Commerce Clause prohibition
of the risk of multiple taxation that
Wynne's approach deviates from the
Court's approach in its pre-Wynne case
law as described below.
When both the state of residence
and the state of source have a legitimate daim to tax income, there are
wich:.<:sptead ungcrstandings that the
suite ofrt'$l<:reh'.C¢ ordinarily yl.elds to
the state of source to avoid double
taxation. This is true as a matter of
national .and international practice.23
indeed, it is also true as a matter of
subnational practice in the United
States, a point the Court acknowledged in Wynnt. The Court recognized
that states taxing income on the basis
of residence yield to states that tax the
same inc.ume on the basis of source.
observing that "the near-universal

15
tll

11
18
19

20
21

zz
23

term 'source" ls normally used to desa1be the locallon
where Income Is earned and tl1us IS taxable by a Ju,
rlsdletlon other than the la><payer's residence; In Uie
context of lllOllable or lntang,ble property taxation,
the term ·s1tus· or "buslnesS situs· rather than ·source·
Is typically used IP describe the IOcatJon where such
property Is Situated and Is thus taxable by a IUrlSdlc·
tlon other than the taxpayer's residence.
Ne.v York ex reL Cohn v. Gr~ 300 us. 308 0937),
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U,5; 37(1920),
Lawrence v. State Tax Commn, 286 U$. 276 (1932).
Cohn, supra note 15,
CUrry v. McOln/es.'1, "YJ7 LJ.$ "357 0939)("(0ncome may
be taxed both by the state where rt. rs earned and by
the state ol,ltle reclplent'sdomldlE'.Protectlon. l:l4i1r1elll;
and power aver the subject matter are not confined
to ellher state:~
Shaffer, s1Jpra note 16 <emphasis supplied),
Cohn, supra note 15.
Shaffer, S1Jpra riote 16,,
American Law Institute. Federal Income Tax Project
/ntemattonal Aspects of Un/led states Income 7'//xa·
t/on 6 (1987) ("[u)nder lntematlonally accepted prac·
lice, It Is Incumbent 011 the domldlk1ry Jurls<llcllon to
alleviate., double t.1xat1on by ..some reasonablt?
means'), ...

t
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state practice is to provide credits
against: personal income taxes for . , ,
taxes paid to other States:24
ff both the state of residence and
the state of source could tax income
or properly associated with interstate
commercial activity, the risk of multiple taxation would be inevitable. Accordingly. at least prior to Wynne, the
Court, in accord wit..\ lhe wideSpread
understanding that the state of source
has the stronger tax claim, consistently interpreted the dormant Commerce Clause as requiring the state of
residence to yield to the stdte of source
whenever a.llowing both claims to
prevail would result in multiple taxation of interstate commerce.
The Court articulated the underlying principle in Standard Oil Co. v. Peck,
342 U.S. 382 (1952). The taxpayer, an
Ohio-based corporation, owned boats
and barges that it employed for the
transportation of oil along the Missis··
sippi and Ohio Rivers. The vessels,
though registered in CincinnatL made
only ocr.a.sional stops in Ohio for repairs. Their main terminals were in
other states. Ohio assessed an ad valorem personal property tax on 100%
of the value of the vessels. The Court,
however; in Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge
Lint Co., 336 U.S. 169 0949), had recently sustained the power of a nondomiciliary state to impose a sourcebased tax on an apportioned share of
the value of vessels that operated
within that state. Ohio contended that
Ott did not deprive the domiciliary
state of the power to tax the entire
value of the vessels, a power the
domiciliary state thought it possessed
under the Court's earlier doctrine. The
Court flatly rejected Ohio's rontention,
holding that the state of l't'.sidencc had
to yield to the state of source to avoid

11111~i1 Ti . . .

.

. .· · . . . .....J.:

24 For this proposition, the Court cited Hellersteln5tale
Taxation Treatise 1 20.10, Pll 20·163 to 20·164..
25 Although Standard OIi technically raised only a due
process l55ue, the language or the Courts opinion
plainly speaks to dormant Commer-e Clause con·
cems. In subsequent opinions. the ('.ourt expUcllly In·
c.orporatf:d the principle of Standard OIi into Its dot·
mant Commerce Clause doctrine, as the ensuing
discussion re11eals;
26 Emphasis added,
Z1 See l!rlefol Ta~ Economist~ as Amici Curiae In Sup·
port of Respondents 4.
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the risk of multiple taxation: 'The rule
which permits taxation by two or
more states on an apportionment basis precludes taxation of all of the
property by the state of the domicile.
Otherwise there would be multiple
taxation of interstate operations . , . ~25
Prior to Wynnr, the Court faithfully
adhered to the view that the dormant
Commerce Clause bar against multiple
taxation requires that the power of one
state to tax all of an interstate enterprise's property or income on a residence basis must yield to the power of
other states to tax the same property
or income on a source basis. Thus, in
CtntralRR Co. v. Pmnsylvania. 370 U.S. 607
(1962), the Court sustained the power
of the domiciliary state to impose a tax
on the full value of the taxpayer's
rolling stock, but only because it had
failed to establish that it was subjecl to
an apportioned source-based taxc "in
other i:,iates. As the Court obsetved, "a
State c.asts no forbidden burden upon
interstate commerce by subjecting its
own corporations, though they be engaged in interstdte trdnsport to nondL~criminatory property taxes; However,
the Court squarely reaffirmed the
teachings of Standard Oil, declaring that
"'multiple taxation of interstate opera·tio n s' ... offends the Commerce
Gause; and that "multiple taxation is
possible . , . if there exists some jurisdiction, in addition to the domicile of
the taxpayer, which may corn,tit:utionally impose an ad valorem tax~
In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angdes, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), the Court endorsed the same principle, observing
that
order to prevent multiple taxation of interstate commerce, this Court
has required that taxes must be apportioned among taxing jurisdictions,
so that no instrumentality of commerce is subjected to more than one
tax on its full value.· Turning to potential conflicts between source-based
and residence-based taxation of the
same property, the Court reiterated the
source-trumps-residence principle in
no uncertain tenns: ·n1e corollary of
the apportionment principle, of cour'St~
is that no jurisdiction may tax the instrumentality in full. ·n1e rule wl 1id 1
permits taxation by two or more states
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on an apportionment basis precludes
taxation of all of the prope1ty by the
state of the domicile.... Otherwise
there would be multiple taxation of interstate operations: Standard Oil Co. v.
Peck, 342 U.S., at 384-385~
ln Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissiona- of
Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 0 980), the Court
applied the same rule in the income
tax context, reasoning that the dormant Commerce Clause precludes
one state from taxing all of a taxpayer's income on a residence basis
when another state has the power to
tax an apportioned share of that income on a source basis. In Mobi.l, the
question was whether Vermont could
tax on a source basis an apportioned
share of the dividends that Mobil Oil
Corporation, a New York domiciliary,
received from its foreign subsidiaries.
One of the arguments advanced by
Mobil was that Vermont could not
t1x an apportioned share of such income because it would expose Mobil
to the risk of multiple taxation in light
of New York's alleged power as Mobil's commercial domicile to tax the
dividends on an unapportioned basis.
The Court rejected the undedying
premise of Mobil's argument It first reiterated the basic principle that the dormant Commerce Clause would not tolerate the multiple taxation that would
result from imposition of a tax on Mobil's dividends both ·by apportionment" on a source basis and "by allocation to a single situs" on a residence
basis. A5 the C.ourt put it, "[t]axation by
apportionment and by allocation to a
single situs arc theoretically incommensurate, and if the latter method is ronstitutionally preferred a tax based on
the fonner c;annot be sustained~ While
multiple taxation of the same income
was constitutionally unacceptable. the
Court was nevertheless willing to 'assume. for the present purposes, that the
State of commercial domidle has the
power to lay some tax on 1he appellant's
dividend income~ze Howeve1; when it
came to the ultimate question whether
the state of residence trumps the slate
of source in the face of conflicting
claims to the same income, the Court
reaffirmed the rule that residence must
yield to source. Thu.s, although the state
Sl"ATE & LOCAL

of commercial domicile has the power

lions of why the Court rejected that Maryland's regime as a tax that fell
proposition; where the Court's opin- within a familiar-perhaps the most
ion leaves the dormant Commerce familiar-dormant Commerce Clause
theo1y why that power should be ex- Clause, in general. and more spec.ifi- rule invalidating state taxes, mmely.
clusive when tl1e dividends reflect in- willy, the pre-Wynne dormant ·(::;qm- a tax that discriminates against intercome from a unitary business, part of inerf.'e Clause law (as we knewJt) ad- state commerce.
which is conducted in other States. In dressed to multiple taxation; whether
How did the Court accomplish this
that situation, the income bears relation the changes that Wynne arguably doctrinal solution? It did so by adoptto benefits and privileges conferred by made in the pre-Wynne law are signif- ing a definition of•discrimination" adseveral Stales. These are the circum- icant as a theoretical and practical vanced bv some well-respected acastances in which apportionment is or- matter; and what que.stions arc likely demic ec~nomists. albeit definition
dinarily the accepted method" In short to be encountered in light of Wynne. with which state tax lawyers (or, at
a residence-based tax "allocating" a tax- It is to these questions that the bal- least, this state tax lawyer) were genpayer's ~nlire i.ncome to a siJ)$le stati; ance of this article is directed.
erally unfamiliar. Specifically, the
did not prevail over a sour(.t:c~ tax
economists argued that the way to
apportioning a taxpayer's income to 'l1teRejectionofthe
determine whether a tax is discrimithe states in which it docs business.
CommerceCJause Doctrine
natory is to cbmpare a tax on wholly
Had the Court in y\,ynnr followed its That Source Trumps ltesJdence
domestic inoomt' (defined as a tax th,n
et\ilier decisions requiring state taxes Perhaps the most specific-and sur- a resident pays on in-state source inbased on residence to yield to state prisil'1g"'.aspect: of Wynne was Jts rejec- come) with the combined tax on outtaxes based on source, the decision tion of the generally accepJ~d propo- bound income (the tax the resident
would have followed easily. Maryland's sition, which appeared to be solidly pays on incoin.ef:rom $0.ur<:es ilH>ther
raxing regime created precisely the risk ,groun<!lt!d. in the Court's dormant states) and il'lbound Income (the. tax
of multiple taxation identified in the Cornm:erce Oause precedents, that a the nonresident pays on income from
Court's earlier decisions. Maryland im- residence-based tax must yield to a sources within the taxing state). If the
posed a tax on all the income earned source-based tax to avoid the multiple tax on the cross-border income Cinby its residents and <>n all th<: lnrqme taxation that would result from hon- bound and outbound) exceeds the tax
earned in· Matyland by 11011,;ei;Jdetits. oring both taxing claims in full The on domestic income there is tax disIt failed to provide full relief against its qµes;fio11 thus ~rises why the C'.oU:rt crimination. The economists characresidence-based tax (whether by a a'dqpte~ tNs positi91\ espetjttlly: ll'.1 terized this discrimination as equivacredit, apportionment, or exemption) Ushfoflts 9wn ~cognition thi:trihe lent to "an import or export tariff.'21
for tdxes imposed by other states when spqrr.e,.tru:rnp~"'.rcsi~~;pril:\9plt re,- perhaps the quintessential violation
the income Matyland taxed is earned fleeted "the near-universal state prac- of the Commerce Clause.
in those slates and is also taxed there tice: at least in th.e context of state perInterestingly, the Court never deon a source basis. As a consequence, sonal income taxation. Although one scribed the economists' precise
the risk of multiple taxation for resi- can only speculate about the answer, methodology for determining
dents who cross state lines to engage the most plausible explanation is that whether a tax is discriminatory. In-·
in economic activity was indisputable. th.is concession was essential to getting stead, it simply relied on the characAccordingly, under the settled law re- a majority of votes needed to invali- terization of the disparity identified by
flected in the Court's pre-Wynne dor- date the tax. Evidently there are some the econotnists a5 a "tariff.' noting that:
mant Commerce Clause doctrine, Justices who are uncomfortable with "th[e] identity between Maryland's tax
Maryland, as the stnt-e of restpence. the Court "legislating" a rule of prior- and a tariff is fatal because tariffs are
would h.aVe had to yield to claims of ity-no matter how widely accepted [tlhe paradigmatic example of a law
the state or st.ates of source. in order to that rule may be in theory. in practice, that discriminates against interstate
avoid the multiple taxation that and (prior to Wynne) in federal con- commerce; and that "tariffs ... are so
would-and in the case of the VVynnes stitutional law.
· jii:!tt11tly unconstituti~nal ,that our
did-otherwise result
So, faced with the reluctance of itases reveal not a sirt$!.e .attempt by
some Justice~ to adopt a rule of pri- anySfo'l'tl'totm:aitone~ Mor~over, the
ority. ~l:1.t;di¢lthf('.;burt do? It shoe- Coli.rt rioted that "when asked'a\:)out
WYNNB:TBE
horne<l th¢i~~m,tp,a doctrip.al mode the ... analysis made by amid Tax
UNABRD>GEDVEBSION
with which the wavering Justices Economists.,. coun.~el for Maryland
As noted at the outset of this art:ide, would feel more comfortable, namely, :~'.$ponded: 'I do.nlt'dlspJ;it'e':ti1e·maththe Court in Wynn, explicitly repudi- that the Maryland scheme "discrimi- ·.,e},:iatics. TheylGl.e·m(!,Wher\'lhey shifl:
ated the proposition that its opinion nat:ed" against interstate commerce. from tariffs to income taxes:" How"requires that a State taxing ba.sed on This maneuver permitted the Court to ever, the Court saw no reason why
residence to 'recede' to a State taxing strike clown the tax without "legislat- "our analysis should change because
based on source~ This raises the ques- ing" a rule of priority and to condemn we deal with an income tax rather
to tax "some" of the appellant's dividend income, "there is no reason in
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than a formal tariff.' Furthermore, the
Court noted that "[n]onc of our dissenting colleagues dispute this economic analysis~
Most significantly. the Court's embrace of the economists' definition of
tax discrimination allowed the Court
without adopting a priority rule for
source over residence, to invoke the
internal consistency test as the appropriate metric for "translating• the
economists' definition of discrimination into familiar constitutional doctrine that would result in the condemnation of the Maryland tax. As the
Court, observed, ·the internal consistency test reveals what the undisputed
economic analysis shows; Maryland's
tax is inherently distTiminatory and
operates as a tariff.' And in case the
reader missed the observation the first
time the Court made it, the Court subsequently reiterated that "the intemal
consistency test and economic analysis ... confirm that the tax scheme operates as a tariff and discriminates
against interstate commerce~
In short the Court's doctrinal approach allowed it to invalidate the
Maryland tax sd1eme under a familiar
constitutional principle (the internal
consistency test) based on bedrock
dormant Commerce Gause jurisprudence (discriminatory taxes, in general, and tariffs, in particular, constitute virtually per se Commerce Gause
violations) without "requir[ing] a State
taxing based on residence to 'recede'
to a State taxing based on source~ If
such doctrinal legerdemain was the
price of attracting five votes to condemn a tax regime that violates sound

and widely accepted norms of crossborder tax. policy, perhaps one should
simply be grateful for the result and
not pursue this issue any further After
all, there is the old adage about not
looking a gift horse in the mouth.
The Dormant Commerce
Clause Prohibition of Tu:es
creating me Risk of Muitiple
Tu:Burdens After Wynne

Despite the temptation to leave well
enough alone, the Court's approach
does raise a number of additional
questions that warrant further exploration. Perhaps the most fundamental
question raised by the Court's opinion
in Wynn, is this: Does the Court's fullthroated endorsement of the internal
consistency principle for identifying
unconstitutional "double taxation ...
that discriminate[sl in favor of intrastate over interstate activity,' along
with its rejection of judicially articulated "priority" rules (such as source
over residence) for avoiding cumulative tax burdens, mean that internal
consistency is the only principle (apart
from extraterritorial taxation or "external consistency-211) for determining
whether a tax imposes an unconstitutional risk of cumulative tax burdens in violation of the Commerce
Clause?
Such a reading of Wynne is certainly
plausible. While the Court was careful
•not to decide the L'Onstitutionality of
a hypothetical tax scheme that Maryland might adopt" its analysis relied
almost entirely on the internal consL5tency test in evaluating the constitutionality of alternatives to Mary-

..t§#·.· . .··

,-he

earned

principle that a Stale may r1ot tax value
outside Its borders rests on Uie fundarnental rl:1QUlre,
ment of both the Due Proc-ess aause ztnd COmrnerce
Clauses that there t>e some deOnlte link. some mini·
mum connec.tloo betweilr1 a state and the persor\
property, or transactlOn II. seeks to tax.~ AUled·SigfliJl
Inc. v. Director. DlviS/ori or r,//)(n, 504 us. 768 099.?)
Ontemal citation omitted). As l1ie Court ob<..erved In
A/HerNS/g1111t, 'ttlhe reason the Commerce Cla\Jse In·
dudes this llmll ls sell-evident In a Union ol 50 States.
to permit ea,"h state to tax actlvltle~ outside Its bor·
ders would have drastic consequences for the na,
Uooal ,'COnorny. as businesses could be subject to se·
w1e multiple taxation.· The Court has also artlCUlaled
the 5am(J principle urider the "external conslstt'11cv·
requirement, See Heller stein, Slaro T.1xation Tre;)t/Se,
supra note 4, 'I 4.1612) (discussing ·extenl/11 coni;ls·
tency" doctrlnel,.:The llmlts on extraterritorial or ex·
temally Inconsistent taxes. however. do not. In and of

28.
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33
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themselves. prevent the states from taxing out-orstate values on a restdence basis. because. as was
noted earner. the Just1nca11on for re!ildence-based
taxes rests on the 'telnJovment ol privileges or resl·
dence In the stale and the attendant right lo Invoke
the prot~'CLIOn ol 115 laws,' no( on the relatlonshlP of
the state to valu..>s taxed, Cohn, supra note 15.
The Court later reiterates this point citing Moorman
for "dlStlngulshlng 'the potential consequences of the
use of dlll'erent forrm,las by two states.' which IS not
prohiolted by the Commerce Clause, from discrimination that 1nhere[sl In either State's lorrnula' which
IS prohibited:
Apart from extraterrltOrlal tru<atlon or external consts-·
t.ency. Slee supra note 28:'
Emptlasls added, .
l:::mphasis added,,
See supra note 28.

land's tax regime. Moreover, the
Court's repeated invocation in Wynne
of Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,
437 U.S. 267 (1978), in distinguishing
between "(1) tax schemes that inherently discriminate against interstate
commerce, without regard to the tax
policies of other states" and "(2) tax
schemes" like those in Moorman 'that
create disparate inceniives io engage
in interstate commerce (and some··
times result in double taxation) only
as a result of the interaction of two
different but nondiscriminatory and
internally consistent schemes• can be
read as reflecting the Court's belief that
an internally consistent tax. creating
the 1isk of multiple tax burdens does
not offend the dormant Commerce
Clause.a
In Moorman, the Court rejected the
taxpayer's argument that Iowa's single-fador sales formula, considered in
conjunction with the similar threefactor formulas of property, payroll,
and sales employed at that time by 44
of the 45 states other than Iowa, exposed the taxpayer to an unconstitutional risk of multiple taxation in violation of the Commerce Clause. In
so holding the Court declared:
The only conceivable constitutional
basis for invalidati,ng the Iowa statute
would be that the Commerce Oause
prohibits any overlap in the computation of taxable income by the States. If
the Constitution were read to mandate
such precision in interstate taxation, the
consequences would extend far beyond
this particular case. For some risk of duplicative taxation exists whenever the
States in which a corporation does busi-·
ness do not follow identical rules for the
division of income. Accepting appellant's
view of the Constitution, therefore,
would require extensive judicial lawmaking. Its logic is not limited to a prohibition on use of a single-factor
apportionment formula. The asserted
constitutio1'1al flaw in that formula is that
it is different from that presently employed by a majority of States and that
difference creates a risk of duplicative
taxation. But a host of other division of
income problems create precisely the
same risk and would similarly ri~e to
constitutional proportions.

If the Court belkves that Moorman
controls the outcome in Wrnne, internal consistency may well be a. sine qua
non of a claim'° that a tax that creates
the risk of multiple taxation prohibSTATE & LOCAL

ited by the dormant Commerce
Clause in a post-Wynnt world. How-

ever, if Wynne is so read, it reflects a
significant departure from prior
precedent Moorman, after all involved
a conflict between different states'
sourcing rules, namely, determining
the source of corporate income by
formula. Although the risk of multiple
taxation may have been palpable in
the light of the then-existing configuration of states' apportionment formulas, the risk of multiple taxation, at
least in principle, was adventitious.
While a taxpayer with all its sales in
Iowa but all its property and payroll
in other states with three-factor formulas would pay tax on 167% of its
income (100% to Iowa and 67% to
states where its property and payroll
were located), a taxpayer with all its
property and payroll in Iowa and all
its sales in other states with three-factor formulas would pay a tax on only
33% of its income (0% to Iowa and
33% to states where its sales were
made). In short; a conflict between internally consistent, but. divergent,
sourcing rules can lead to overtaxation or undertaxation, assuming that
exposure of 100% of the taxpayer's
tax base (no more or no less) is the
appropriate norm, which is the assumption reflected in the internal
consistency principle.
Wynne, by contrast, involved a conflict between one state's residencebased rules and another state's
source-based rules, where the risk of
multiple taxation was intxorablt not
adventitious. Wholly apart from the
specific question raised in Wynne
(whether residence must yield to
source in the taxation ofpersonaUncome), the more fundamental question is whether a state seeking to tax
lOOo/o of a tax base on some plausible
basis (e.g., residence, location of economic activity, location of property)
must yield to the tax daims of other
jurisdictions seeking to tax a portion
of that tax base on some plausible basis (e.g., source. location of economic
activity, or location of property).
Prior to Wynn,. the Court generally
resolved those conflicts, without resort: to the internal consi~tency prinSTATE & LOCAi.

ciple, by requiring the state seeking to
tax the entire tax "pie" to yield to the
state seeking to tax only a "slice· of
that "pie~ As the Court put it in Mobil
Oil Corp. (discussed above), "[tlaxation
by apportionment and by allocation
to a single situs are theoretically incommensurate, and if the latter
method is constitutionally preferred.
a tax based on the former cannot be
sustained'.'31 Accordingly, the Court
sustained the more limited (but
stronger) claim of the state seeking to
tax the apportioned 'slice" of the pie
rather than the unapportioned ·pie"
in its entirety. Insofar as Wynne abandons this preference in favor of internal consistency; paying equal respect
to states' daims to all of a tax base
and states' competing daims to only
a portion of a tax base, as long they
do not seek to tax both bases simultaneously (in violation of the internal
consistency principle), Wynne has
made a noteworthy modification in
dormant Commerce Clause law.
Further thoughts on Commerce Clause
restraints on cumulative tax burdens and
tntemalconststency. Although the fore-

going reading of Wynne ls plausible, it
is not the only way to read the Court's
opinion. In this connection, it is worth
taking a closer look at the Court's invocation of its gross receipts tax
precedents from the late 1930s and
1940s in support of its conclusion. It
will be recalled that the Court declared
that its decisions in J.D. Adams (1938),
Gwin, White & Princt (1939), and Central
Greyhound (1948) were "particularly instructive" precedents as 'three cases
involving the taxation of domestic corporations•n in which the Court struck
down a state tax scheme that ·might
have resulted in double taxation of
income earned out of the State and
that discriminated. in favor of domestic over interstate state commerce': The .
Court further noted that "we held that
those schemes could be cured by
taxes that satisfy what: we have subsequently labeled the 'internal consistency' test:
The Court's description of these
cases, while in service to an understand ab le objective-condemning
Maryland's residence-based tax as

discriminatory for failure to satisfy
the internal consistency test-does not
provide a complete picture of their
import:. Although these cases involved "dome.stic" corporations, and
thus "residents" of the st.ates in question, the taxpayers' residence was of
no relevance to the cases, and any
implication that the cases involved
residence-source conflicts (like the
conflict at issue in Wynne) would be
mistaken. In J.D. Adams, the Court explicitly noted that "[t]he tax is not an
excise for the privilege of domicile
alone"; rather it was ·a tax upon gross
receipts from commerce~ Similarly, in
Gwin, White & Pri.nct, although the tax
was imposed upon a Washington
corporation, that fact had no bearing
on the Court's analysis, which turned
on the measure of the tax "imposed
upon appellant's activities in Washington~ In CmtralGllyhound. the Court
did not even mention the residence
of the corporation (the Wynm Court
had to cite the dissent for that point),
and the issue in the case was simply
whether New York could tax all the
receipts from "points within the State
but over routes that utilize the highways of Pennsylvania and New Jersey.' To repeat: Not one of these cases
involved as did Wynne, an unalloyed
attempt to tax all of an individual's
or entity's income or receipts simply
because that individual or entity was
domiciled or resident in the state.
Furthermore, although the Court
properly invoked these cases as supporting. with the benefit of hindsight;
the internal consistency principle, a
fair reading of these cases does not
support the proposition that the 'internal consistency· is the etclusiv~ te&t
(apart from extraterritoriality or external consistencyH) for determining
the risk of the exposure to unconstitutional multiple tax burdens under
the dormant Commerce Clause. Instead these cases represented a repudiation of the restrictive and formalistic Commerce Clause doctrine that
created a tax-free zone of immunity
for interstate commerce and adopted
instead a more pragmatic approach
that "mu.st accommodate itself to the
double demand that interstate com-
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merce must pay its way. and that at

foreign countries because the states

(as noted above) tJic Court has assim-

1he same tiine it shall not be burdened

to which the fruit was shipped could

ilated its Due Process Clause prece-

with cumulative exactions which arc
not similarly laid on local businesses~34 Indeed, the Cou1t recognized
in Wyn11e that "beginning with Justice
Stone's seminal opinion in Wtslern Live
Stock ... , and continuing through
cases like J. D. Adams and Gwin, White
& Prince, the direct-indirect burdens
test was replaced with a more practical approach that looked to the eco·nomic impact of the tax~
Accordingly, while J.D. Adams,
Gwin, White & Prince, and Central Greyhound contain language that anticipates the internal consistency principle, the cases may also be read for 1he
broader proposition that reflected,
and arguably continues to reflect, the
Court's dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Thus, J.D. Adams held
that Indiana could not impose a tax
on the unapportioned gross receipts
that an Indiana taxpayer received
from its sale of machinery manufactured in Indiana to purchasers in
other states because the states in
which 1he sales were made could also
tax such receipts, thus creating a risk
of a multiple tax burden on interstate
commerce to which intrastate commerce would not be subjected. Similarly, Gwin, White & Prince held 1hat
Washington could not impose a tax
on the unapportioned gross receipts
that a Washington taxpayer received
from the marketing of fruit shipped
from Washington to o1her states and

also tax such receipts, thus creating a
risk of a multiple tax burden on in-·
terstate commerce to which intrastate
commerce would not be subjected.
Likewise, Central Greyhound held that
New York could not tax the
unapportioned gross receipts from
transportation that were also subject
to tax in other states, thus creating
a risk of a multiple tax burden on
interstate commerce to which intrastate commerce would not be subjected. These cases can fairly be read
a5 standing for the proposition that
states that seek to tax 100% of a tax
base on an unapportioned basis
must yield to states that can tax
the same receipts on some other
plausible basis, whether or not the
unapportioned taxes are internally
inconsistenvs
Finally, whatever one may say
about post-Wynnt dormant Commerce Oause doctrine prohibiting income and gross receipts taxes that
create 1he rL5k of multiple tdxation, it
seems clear that the rule requiring residence to yield to source remain5 true
in the context of tangible personal
property (based on the precedents
discussed above), to which the Wynne
Court makes no reference. 1he explanation for this difference lies in part
in the fact that the cases involving
tangible personal property implicate
Due Process Clause as well as Commerce Oause concerns, even though

dents involving tangible personal
property into its Commerce Clause
cases involving the same issue.36 'fhus,
in contrast to cases involving income
and intangible property. where the
Court has made it dear tl1at the Due
Process Clause does not bar double
taxation by the state of residence and
the state of source,31 the Court's precedents limiting states' power to tax tangible personal property on the basis
of residence when o1her states have
power to tax such property on the
bash; of source or ·situs" may be explained on the theory that tangible
personal property cannot. as a matter
of principle, be ·1ocated• in two states
at once and the source state's power
to tax such property effectively ·removes" that property from the state
of residence, without establishing a
"priority" rule over legitimate claims
based on source and residence to the
same tax base. Although such analysis
may seem somewhat strained, and
Boris Bittker in a characteristically
trencha.nt critique has argued that it
is not analytically defensible under the
Due Process Clause,38 the 'priority" of
source over residence appears to be
alive and well in the context of state
taxation of tangible personal property.

34
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Western live Stockv. Bureau of Revenue. 303 U.S. 240
09381 See generally Hellersteln, State Taxation Trear;;e,supra note 4, '\I 409(traclng developrr~mt of rnul·
~pie taxation docllinel.
Although one might also say Uiat such taxes simply
violate the requirement that a stale not lmpo~) ex·
tralerrdcx'lol. unfairly apport.kx·1ed, 01 exlemally lrn.1:,n·
sis tent ta.<es. Sl.'!e surx11 note 28, that wo1,1rJ t~) rK> an·
swer 111 the case of a tax baSE<l on residence nor. one
might aroue, cm some other local event that was ar·
guably coonec.ted to all of a taxpayer's Income or
grossrecelpts

M S1>.etextaccompa1w1ng notes 14·25supra,
n Se.e Swain and Hetlerstcln. supra notcy 11. at 221. 226.

I
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Blttker. "The Taxation of Out-of.·State Tangible Prop·

erty; 56 Yale L. J,640 (1947). Blttk<?r'; analy;ls did not

address Commerce Cl~use ·restraints <>n state taXil·

tlOn
mathematics. a binary operation Is commutative
If changing the order of the operands does not
Change the result.....,. Most. Familiar as I.lie name of lhe
property that says·') • 4 ~ 4 +3' or ·2 x 5 • 5 x 2'.' See

39 ·111
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or

en.wlklpedlaorg/wlkl/Comrnutallve_propertyffCorn·
mutatlve_operatlonsJn.everyooy.Jifa
40 Hellersteln. et al.. ·commerce Clause Restraints on
State Taxation After Jefferson Lh1es,• 51 Tax L. Rev. 47
(1995). See also Hellerstein. State Tax11t/o/J Treatise,
s11pra rl0te4. 118.09(3J[dl
41 As Mitt Romney famously deelare<i See www.wash·
1ngtonpost.rc0m/polltlcs.lmltt·romr1eY·S&Y!l'(".Orpora·
t10ns,,11-e·people/2011/00/TI/glQABw?.:l81.story.htmL
,u Proft'S.'iOI' Coenen r:iut the relevant point this waY:
!Tlhls effort to dlstlngulsl1 between natural and artlf\dal
persons rn'!kes no sense•.Indeed. l/1e effort Is pcrver.;e
because It would st~p ttie laws aid from 01111narv lndl·
vlduafs, while anording al~out constltu!lonal protectklr1
to corporate tirarl\S. ll may or may not be lhal ·corpora·
Uons are peopl!!." But one thing Is ror sure: People are
people. And on no sound tt1eory ,;t,ould IJ(tuai p..ople
be aeprived of dormant Commerce c.,u~ protec:Uons,
even a5 those protections operate to afford complete
shelter to arUflcla1 entities Who owe IJ'lelr very eiustell(.e
to the munmcence of the slatr..Coenen.
-Why Wynne Should Win." 67 Vand, ,L Rev. En Banc
217. "l2fr27 (2014),
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Other Commerce Clause Questions
Addressed In Wynne

In 1he course of its opinion in Wynne,
the Court addressed and resolved a
number of subsidiary questions that
are worthy of brief discussion.
Taxes on gross recclptsversus taxes on
net income. As already observed, the

Court in Wynne relied heavily on gross
receipts taxes (J.D. Adams. Gwin, White,
& Prince, and Central Greyhound) in determining the appropriate analytical
framework for adjudicating the mnstitutionality of a net income tax. In
response to Justice Ginsburg's claim
in dissent that the Court had traditionally distinguished between gross
receipts and net income taxes, the
Court rejected the claim as inconsistent with its contemporary approach
to state taxation under the Commerce
Clause: ·we see no reason why the
STATE & LOCAL

distinction between gross receipts and
net income should matter, particularly
in light of the admonition that we
must consider 'not the formal language of the tax statute but rather its
practical effect'." In the Court's view,
"the discarded distinction between
taxes on gross receipt-., and net income
was based on the notion, endorsed in
some early cases, that a tax on gross
receipts is an impermissible 'direct'
and 'immediate' burden on interstate
commerc..-e. whereas a tax: on net income is merely an 'indirect and incident.al' burden."
One intriguing question raised by
the Court's repudiation of the "dis··
carded distinction" between gross receipts and net income taxes, whirh justified the Court's J'(']ance in Wynne on
gross receipts tax precedents to evaluate the constitutionality of a net income tax, is whether this doctrinal
development: is subject to the commutative principle,)9 so that net income
tax precedents may now be invoked
in evaluating the constitutionality of
gross receipts taxes, !hls..\1V.e$ti.on h;
pa.rtlrulady relevantto the qvestion of
falr i\pportionment: Although JJ),

Maw; Gwin, WhW:. &:f'rintt i\.nd Cmtr:oJ
Grtyhoundstrongly support die pl1'.ipq-

siti6n thatsrossrecei{)ts@xes, li~e net

income taxes, are subject to the Commerce Clause de.mands of fair apportionment, the Court in fact has been
less than rigorous in implementing
those demands when adjudicating the
constitutionality of gross receipts taxes
measured by inbound sales as distinguished (at least in JD. Ada.ms and Gwin,
Whitt 6'.Prina) from gross receipt raxes
measured by outbound sales.
In a series of cases involving Washirigton's gross receipts tax-the tax: at
issue in Gwin, Whitt & Prince-the Court
sustained taxes measured by the unappdmdrted>gross rece~let~m .inter.statelic!tivitf
the objections that
the levies were unfairly apportioned.
Thus in General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964), the Court sustained, over Commerce Claus obj<:ctions, the state's tax on all the gross
receipts that General Motors derived
from its sa.les of cars to Washington
retailers, despite the factthatmanufac-

6ver
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tu ring and assembly occurred out5ide
the state. The Court's rationale for sustaining the tax was that it was imposed
on "instate activity'.' Similarly, in Standard Pressed Sttd Co. v. IJqJartmml of Revmur,
419 U.S. 560 (1975), involving the application of Washington's tax to the
unapportioned gross receipts from
sales that an out-of-state supplier
rrladc to the Boejng Company, the
Court declared that 'the tax is on the
gross receipts from sales made to a local consumer; whirl, may have some
impact on commerce .... Yet ... it is
'apportioned exactly to the activities
taxed; all of which are intrastate~ Subsequently, in Tyltr Pipe Industrirs, Inc. v.
Washington State Dcpartmmi of Revamc,
483 U.S. 232 (1987), involving the applk:t)li©U of Was.hitigl-qn's tax to the
UQijf!p,or:(lpn«J ~ipts from sales that
an out-of-state manufacturer made to
an in-state customer; the Court declared: "Washington tax:es the full value
of receipts from in-state wholesaling...;
thus, an out-of-state manufacturer
selling in Wa<Jhington is subject to an
unapportioned wholesal.e tax: even
though the value of the wholesale
transaction is partly attributable to
manufacturing activity carried on in
another State that plainly has jurisdiction to tax that activity. This apportionment argument rests on the erroneous assumption that through the
[business and occupation] tax, Wash-·
ington is taxing the unitary activity of
manufacturing and wholesaleing ...
[T]he activity of wholesaling-whether
by an in-state or an out-of-state manufacturer-must be viewed as a separate
activity conducted wholly within
Washington that no other State has jurisdiction to t.ax.'.'
lhe Court's decisions in GmeralMolors, S1andanl fussed Steel, and Tyl.tr Pipe are
difficult, if not impossible.. to square
with a principled implementation of the
fair apportionment principle. As Justice
Brennan observed in his dissent in Gm·
rral Motors-a dissent that applies equally
to the Court's decisions in Standard
Prl'Sied Steel and Tyle.r Pi.pr -"if commercial
activity in more than one State results
in a sale in one of them, that State may
not claim as all its own the gross receipts to which the activity within its

borders has contributed only a part
Such a tax regime must be apportioned
to reflect tlie business activity within
the taxing State:' Indeed the present author has argued at length elsewhere
that the Court's analysis in the WashingtonG1ses i5 unfuithfi.il to the fairappot1:ionrrt<1'nt reqtiiremml as reflected
in the Court's net income tax precedents, in addition to being in tension
with its gross receipts tax mlings in JD,
Adarrts, Gwin, White & Prina, and Cmtral
Greyhound.40 The purpose here, however,
is not to reargue the case, but simply
to suggest that Wynne may have given
the argument a new lease on life. After
all the rhetoric of Wynne obliterates the
distinction between gross receipts and
net income taxes. Furthermore, the
Court's opinion in Wynnr reinvigorates
the application of the fair apportionment principle to gross receipts taxes
both directly (by its reliance on ].D.
Ada.ms, Gwin White & Prina, and Catlral
Grq,hound) and indirectly by suggesting
that precedents requiring fair apportionment of net income are equally applicable to gross receipts taxes.
TalolsonlndivldualsversustaxesoncorPomtions. ln justifying its reliance on
].D. Adams, Gwin White & Prina, and Cm-

tral Greyhound-all of which involved
corporations-to invalidate Maiyland's
personal income tax: scheme.. the Court
rejected the contention that dormant
Commerce Oause principles provided
less protection to individuals than to
corporations. The Court found it "hard
to see why the dormant Commerce
Oause should treat individuals less favorably than corporations~ since any
tax, whether imposed on a corpomtion
or an individual, may burden interstate
commerce, and there was no basis for
distinguishing between the two classes
of taxpayers based on the services they
received from the state. So whether or
not'"corporations are people:41 it seems
fair to conclude that insofar as Commerce Clause protections are concerned people are corporations, or at
least cannot be treated worse than corporations when it comes to taxes on
interstate activity,<12
Tbe Commerce Clause protects residents from their own state taxes. The

Court in Wynm had another oppor-
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tunity to consider its observation in
Goldberg v, Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989),
that 'lilt is not a purpose of the Commerce clause to protect state residents
from their own state taxes~ As the
Court observed in Wrme, it had earlier
·repudiated that dictum in West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186
(1994), where we stated that '[s)tate
taxes are ordinarily paid by in-state
businesses and consumers, yet if they
discriminate against out-of-state
products, they are unconstitutional:"
Notably, the dissenting opinions of
both Justice Scalia and ofJustice Ginsburg sought to resuscitate the Cour1'.s
remark in Goulberg in challenging the
residents' attack on Maryland's taxing
scheme. For the second and, one
would hope, the last time, the Court
repudiated its ill-considered dictum in
Goldba-9, noting that it had entertained
many dormant Commerce Clause
challenges brought by state residents,
including in Goldberg itself.

more than it may at the srate level~•s
Brief elaboration on this point may
nevertheless be useful because of the
differences in the ways that local taxes
treat nonresidents a.s well as in the
way that state..s grant credits for taxes
imposed by other states' localities, and
the implications of Wynne for this differential treatment
First to restate the governing prin-·

ciple, there is no distinction for federal
constitutional purposes between state
and local taxes for dormant Commerce
Clause purposes. The principle was
clearly articulated in a case raising the
question of whether an out-of-state
vendor, which had sufficient nexus
with a state to enable the state to require the vendor to collect the state's
use tax; could also be required to collect local use taxes in local jurisdktions
where, if the locality were viewed as a
st.ate, the taxpayer would not have sufficient nexus for use tax collection purposes. In Aldcns, Inc. v. Tully, 49 N.Y.2d
525, 404 N.E.2d 703 (1980), an out-ofhnpactof Wynne on
state, mail-order business was lkensed
Local Income Taxes
to do business in New York and,
One question not addressed in Wynne- through a wholly owned subsidiary.
although it might have seemed rele- maintained offices and employees at
vant because of the opinlon's focus on four different locations in the st.ate. 1he
the "county portion of the tax-was taxpayer challenged the right of the
the impact of the case on local income st1tr. to require it to collect local, as distaxes. As explained above,43 this was tinguished from state, use taxes on
not an issue in Wynne itself; because goods sold and delivered by it to purthe county portion of the tax was, in chasers in every locality within the
fact, a "state" tax as a matter of state state, because its only contact with
law; 'Jl1e important point here, as afoo many of the localities was by mail and
noted, is that this would have been common c.arrie1:
true as a matter of federal constituAfter noting that the statute clearly
tional law, even if the county portion required any vendor maintaining a
of the tax were independent of the place of busin('.ss in the state to collect
state portion of the tax for state law local as well as ~tate use taxes, the New
purpose.s, because, for fl.>d.eral consti- York Court of Appe,ils rejected the taxtutional purposes, the distinction be- payer's constitutional objections to the
tween state and local taxes has no imposition of the local use tax collecmeaning-they are all exercises of tion obligation. The court acknowl-"state· power insofar as the Constitu- edged that an out-of-state vendor
tion is concerned.44 Indeed, the Mary-- whose only contact with a state was
land Court of Appeals made this very through the mail or mmmon carrier
point in its opinion below: "whether could not be required to collect the
the t.ax is nominally a state or county state's use tax. The court then declared:
tax is irrelevant for purposes of analyPetitioner argues by wishful extrapolation that the imposition of the duty of
sis under the dormant Commerce
collection of all local use taxes within the
Gause because a state may not un-·
State on a seller which is located only in
reasonably burden interstate comparticular counties within the State and
whose only connection with buyers in
merce through its subdivisions any
14
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other local tax areas L5 by mail or by
common carrier is similarly infirm.
However. simply because there are constitutional limitations on the burdens
that may be placed on interstate commerce, it docs not follow, nor is there
any precedent for holding, that burden
is to be measured by fiirther compartmentalization of each state into its municipal subdivisions. No historical
predicate is advanced to indicate that in
assuting protection of commerce among
the severai States, any such int.rasiate
partitioning was contemplated, and pt:-titioncr cites no Supreme Court cases so
holding.46

What does this mean for the constitutionality of "local" income taxes
after Wynne? Because local income
taxes are simply state taxes for dor-·
mant Commerce Gause purposes, the
appropriate way to analyze such taxes
is to consider them as part of the
state's tax structure (a5 in Wynne). So,
for ex.ample, if a locality (like New
York City) imposes an income tax
solely on its residents without giving
any credit for income taxes that its
residents pay to other states, such a
tax would be treated as part of New
York's state tax structure. That tax
structure would he viewed as imposing a conventional (and internally
consistent) statewide income tax on
all residents and nonresidents of the
state, with a credit for taxes that residents pay on income earned in other
states, along with an unconventional
(but internally consistent) tax confined to New York City residents with
no credit for taxes that such city residents pay to other states. If internal
consistency is the only dormant
Commerce Clause requirement for assuring that a tax does not impose a
risk of multiple tax: burdens, an issue
we have addressed above, the New
York regime would survive constitutional scrutiny.
By mntrast for example, if a local-·
ity Oike Kansas City, Missouri) im-:
poses an income tax on residents and
nonresidents but denies a credit for
income taxes that its residents pay to
other states, such a tax would be
treated as part of M.issouri's state tax
strud:ure. That tax structure (analogous to the tax structure at issue in
Wynne) would be vi.ewed as imposing
a conventional (and internally conSTATE 6 l.OCAL

sistent) income tax on all residents
and nonresidents of lhe state, with a
credit for taxes that residents pay on
income earned in other states, along
with an unconventional (and internally inconsistent) tax regime con···
fined to Kansas City residents, and to
nonresidents of the city earning income within the city, but with no
credit for t.J.ie income tax that Kansas
City resident5 pay on income earned
in other states.
Finally, it is worth considering the
obligation of a state like Kansas to
provide a credit against its state income tax for the income truces that its
residents pay to Kansas City, Missouri.
Following the logic of the preceding
disrussion, assuming Kansas generally
imposes a tax on the income that its
residents earn from all sources, as well
as a true on income that nonresidents
earn from sources in Kansas, Kansas
would be required, under internal
consistency analysis, to provide a
credit against the Missouri tax (including the tax imposed by localities
in Missouri).
This is because if every state
adopted a tax regime that imposed a
tax on all of the income that its residents earned from all sources and all
of the income that nonresidents
earned from sources within the state,
but gave a credit only for the portion
of other states' taxes that were labeled
··state" rather than "local" taxes, a truc·(l!lyer confitµ(18.her.~¢thrify \q'a ~il)gle
~ta~e would pay cmly thJ:! ~~~s l¢)tied •
by a single state (whether denominated ·state• or "local") whereas a taxPJW<rWho ventured across stat~Jines
would pay both the ~fla~ll!" ta;~9her
state of residmce as well as the portion of the other state's tax denominated a "local" tax.
Wynne and Intemallylnconsfstent
Deflnttions of Resident

The personal income taxes of many
srates define as resident,; (tax.able on
all of their income, regardless of
source) not only those individuals
who are domiciled in the state but
also individuals who exceed a specified threshold of presence in the state
Cso-called "statutory" residents). New
STATE & lOCAL

York, for example, defines a "resident
individual" for personal income tax
purposes as someone "who is not
domiciled in this state but maintains
a permanent place of abode in this
state ... ~47 and spends in the aggregate
more than one hundred eighty-three
days of the tax year in this state. If
every stdte adopted New York's definition of "resident~ taxoavers who
maintained their do~dl~ i~ one state
but spent more than 183 days in another, where they maintained an
abode, would be exposed to a greater
tax burden than taxpayers who confined their activities to a single state.
The former would be treated as a resident of two states, subject to tax on
all their income without regard to
source and, to the ex.tent that the income did not have its source in another state (e.g., income from intangible investments not connected with a
trade or business), often without any
credit for the taxes paid to the other
state. The latter, by contrast, would
pa:y taxes on a residence basis to a
~ihgl\Z state only and; even if !hey paid
taxes to other states, would receive a
credit for such taxes that (by hypothesis) would be imposed on the basis
of source. Hence such statutes clearly
flunk the internal consistency test.
Nevertheless, the few courts that
have addressed taxpayers' claims that
internally inconsistent definitions of
resident for personal income tax purposes are invalid under the dormant
Commerce Oau~-e have rejected these
daims."11 They have done so, however,
not on the ground that the residency
definitions survive scrutiny under the
internal consistency test, a determination that would be difficult, if not impossible, to sq~are with the test.
,i!j

'5ee supra note I(

...

"5 Mary/and State Comptmller of the 7l'easury v. W)tnoo,

431 Md, 147, 64 A,Jd 453 (Ml;l, 2013),
~G Compare to Otyof Hoover v. Ollver & Wright Motors.

Inc:.. 730 5o.2d 60B (AlaJ999) (sustaining wer due
process ob)ecHons state's authority to permit municipalities to Impose local Alabama sales taK outside
their corporate limits but within their police JurlSd!c·
tlon. bec,1use state could delegate to municipalities
power to levy taxes tl1at was coextensive Wjth the
state's taxing powerli
N.Y. Tax Law§ 60S(b)(1)(8).

soi'

Luther v. Comml$Sloner of Revenue. 588 N.W. 2d
(Minn•. 1999): Tamagnl v. Tax Appeals Tribunal. 91
NY.2cf53Q 695 N£2d 1125 Cl998l.
411 See also Noto v.
York Slill.e Dept of T//x'rland Fin,,
2014 NY s11,, Op 3057B(U){Trlal Order)(Sup. Cl. SUffOII<
Cty. 3/3114) . available at www.d'll..>ckpclinUhomson•
reutersJ:orn (dOuble t.,~atlon of ln.estmenl Income
of taxpayers. wl'lO W(,,,re resklents ol boU1 Conm.x:Ucul
arid New York under each states law, did not Vfolate
Commercf1 or Due Process Clause), .
so Lulh<.'.1: .supra note 4a
SI Hellersteln. State TaxalJon rreat/se. supra note 4. ,
20.03[.1] C"Constltutlonallty Undc~ the Commerce
Clauoo or 'lntemalty 1nconsl51e11r 0en111t1ons of 'Resl·
clEJll'.l
48

44 Id.

if1

Rather, these courts have held that the
taxpayers' claims do not implicate the
Commerce Clause at all. 'lhus, in Ia·
magni v. Tax Appcals 1i-ibunal, 91 N.Y.2d
530, 695 N.E2d 1125 (N.Y, 1998), the
New York Court of Appeals dismissed
the "internal consistency· attack on
New York's residency definition by a
New Jersey domiciliary who worked
in New York. where he maintained an
abode, and was thus a New York resident under New York's statute, because the personal "income tax does
not fall on any interstate activity, but
rather on a purely local occurrencethe taxpayer's status as a resident of
New York State."49 The Minnesota
Supreme Court rejected a similar attack on Minnesota's residency definition on the ground that the claim was
not cognizable under the Commerce
Clause because it did not involve interstate commerce.so
The holdings of the New York and
Minnesota courts were open to serious question even prior to Wynnt.
Thus, as th.e author argued elsewhere
long before Wynne was on the horizon. the New York Court of Appeals's
rationale-that taxing a resident on all
of his or her income raises no Commerce Clause issue because it falls "on
a purely local occurrence·-·cannot
be reconciled with the U.S. Supreme
Court's repudiation of a similar argument advanced by the taxing authority in Camps N,:wfound!Owatonna, Inc. v.
1own of Harrison~S1 In Camps Newfound/
Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520
U.S. 564 (I 997), the Court held that
the Commerce Clause applied to a
claim that a local property tax statute
discriminated against interstate commerce by denying a property tax exemption to charitable institutions that

N~;,,,
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were operated principally for nonres- Commerce Clause strictures. Moreidents. In so holding, the Court re- over, as already noted, when two
jected the taJdng authority's claim that states tax an individual on a residence
the dormant Commerce Clause was basis, even though both states will
inapplicable because a local real estate generally provide a credit for taxes
tax was at issue: "A tax on real estate, that their residents earn from sources
like any other tax, may impermissibly in other states,S2 the credit will not exburden interstate commerce~ More- tend to income that does not have its
ove1; the Court continued "ltlo allow source in another state, such as a taxC::i'!'.lf·p fr\ ~1u-'\'irl t·hA c+,.i,~h,,.ar r,:( t-h~
payer's investment income. Indeed,
dormant Commerce Clause by the this description fit the taxpayer in Tasimple device of labeling its discrimi- magni, an investment banker who
natory tax a levy on real estdte would lived in New Jersey but commuted to
destroy the barrier against protection- work in New York, where he mainism that the Constitution provides'.' In tained an apartment To be sure, one
short ifit is interstate commerce that might argue that the internal consisfeels the pinch, it does not matter how tency problem confronted by taxpaylocal the operation which applies the ers surh as Tamagni do not implicate
squeeze:' A personal income tax the Commerce Clause because they
regime that exposes taxpayers who are caused by a personal decision to
cross state lines to greater tax burdens live in one state and work in another.s:i
than those who stay at home would Nevertheless, Wynne has almost cerseem to implicate the Commerce tainly increased the vulnerability of
Clause, even though the discrimina- internally inconsistent definitions of
tion depended on "a purely local oc- residence to attack under the dormant
currence"-the taxpayer's status as a Commerce Clause, and it is only a
"resident~
matter of time before those attacks are
Whatever the force of these argu- launched.114
ments prior to Wy1tnt, Wynne, at a minimum, has provided taxpayers with
additional ammunition to attack in- CONCLUSION
ternally inconsistent definitions of res- Perhaps the most significant questions
idence for personal income tax pur- ra.ised by Wynnr, which has been
poses. The Court in Wynnt relied saved to the end to reward readers
extensively on Camps Ntwjound, refer··· who have had the perseverance to
ring to the case no less than eight read this far, are what practical impact
times in the opinion and quoting the the decision is likely to have and what
case for the proposition that "'[al tax the case (and the various opinions it
on real estate, like any otha tax, may im- spawned) says about the health of the
permissibly burden intetstate com- dormant Commerce Clause and its
merce' (emphasis added); to rebut the prospects for future. As a practical
suggestion that a personal income tax matter. it seems quite unlikely that the
somehow enjoys imm.unity from case will lead to significant changes in
!l
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Heflefslefn. State Taxation Treatise. supra note 4. 1
20.10!21 ('Limitation of Credit to Income DerfVC<l l'rom
Sources In 011,er States'.,>,,
113 Compare to, Reg;\262-l<b)(S) <rommutlng expenses
are nondedu<:llble perscmal expenditures for federal
Income lax purposes}. Flowers. 326 us,. 465 (1946)
112

(same),

114
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55 This assumes that the WY/Ille should be read as endorsing such a regime. whlch as suggested above. ls
a Plausible, but not the onfy p!auslble reading that
Wynne may be given;~ text accompanying notes

28-·37 supra.
Sil

See. e.g. Rosen. 'W)lnne, Cloud Computing. and State's
Deference to Another; State Tax Notes. 618/15, p, 745
C'New York state taxpayer; should be cognizant of
the Wynne dt>clslon and shOUld consJder fifing refund
claims 1r th~'Y have paid-or wlll pay-tax to New York
State as a statutory r~'Sldent ='l.

Brier or the 1n1ernmion,11 MunlCJpal Lawyers As.~ocla-

tl.c,n, The United States Conference ol MaYors. The
N.1t1onal As.c;oclatlon of Counties. The International

City/County Management Assoclatlor1 and The Marv-land A~soclatlon of Counties as Amici Curiae In Sup·
port or l'etlttoner 16. Comptroller ot the Treasury v.
Wyrme (No. 13·485),

what the Court described as 'the
near-universal state practice to provide cTedits against personal income
taxes for ... taxes paid to other States'.'
Although in principle states might
abandon their internally consistent
residence-credit regimes, which tax on
the basis of residence and source, for
an internally consistent residenceonly scheme, that elirninates the
source-based tax,ss this seems highly
improbable in light of the reaction of
voting residents to the adoption of
such a regime. At the local level, however. Wynne is likely to have more of a
practical impact because "many states
and municipalities do not grant a
complete credit to their residents for
all income taxes paid in other jurisdictions."" It rema.ins to be seen
whether states and localities respond
to the problem that Wynne creates for
such regimes by adopting credits for
taxes for their residents, eliminating
the source-based tax on nonresidents,
or some other internally consistent alternative.
As for the heallh of the dormant
Commerce Clat.Lc;e, it seems to have
survived Wynne essentially intact, with
relatively minor doctrinal effects,
some of which may actually have
strengthened its condition. Thus while
the Court may have weak~ned dor-·
mant Commerce Oause restraints on
internally consistent taxes that create
the risk of multiple taxation, it may
have strengthened the clause in reject'"
ing distinctions (advanced by the dissenting opinions) between gross receipts taxes and net income taxes and
between corporations and individuals. Moreover. while Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas reaffirmed their abiding hostility to basic dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, seven Justices
agreed it has a continuing role to pl.ay
in restraining state tax power, even if
only five Justices believed that free
trade principles 0utwelghed principles
of state sovereignty in Wynn, itself. For
the moment at least, the Court has
stayed the course of the dormant
Commerce Clause.. ,.
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